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Abstract 
Gender discrimination in labor markets has been an important issue in labor economics. The main purpose of this 
paper is to empirically study glass ceiling effects, and investigate whether female workers are indeed being 
discriminated against, particularly during the promotion process, in top management positions in Taiwan. This paper 
uses data from 4,485 large firms in Taiwan to study whether there are gender preferences when the chairperson of a 
company chooses a chief executive officer (CEO). The data show that there are few female top executives (about 
6%). In addition, a chairperson tends to team with same sex CEOs. This is especially noticeable among female 
chairpersons. The empirical results from our random matching model further confirm that gender is neither irrelevant 
nor neutral when a chairperson names a CEO.
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1.Ⅰ. Introduction 
Previous studies about gender discrimination in labor markets have mainly focused on 
gender wage differentials, occupation segregation, and glass ceiling effects, among others. Glass 
ceiling effects refer to constraints and limitations that are usually not apparent but keep women 
from being fairly promoted. The main purpose of this paper is to study glass ceiling effects, and 
empirically investigate whether female workers are indeed discriminated against during the 
promotion process, particularly at top management positions, in Taiwan. We want to find out 
whether female workers have the same opportunities of being promoted to top positions as male 
workers have. In other words, can gender be an element that affects the probability for women 
to be promoted as top executives? 
Researchers have employed different empirical models and methods to identify and find 
evidence to support the existence of the so-called glass ceiling in labor markets. Typically, they 
either compare gender wage gaps at the high-end of the wage distribution, or examine the gaps 
between prospects or outcomes of promotions for men and women. For example, Albrecht et al. 
(2003) use Swedish national representative data sets, and employ quantile regression approaches 
to study glass ceiling effects. They show that glass ceilings do exist at the top end of the wage 
distribution.  
In terms of prospects or outcomes of promotions, Cannings (1988) found that gender does 
influence the chance of being promoted when career-relevant factors, such as formal education 
and firm specific productivity, are held constant. The author also found that female workers’ 
promotion rate is only about 80% of that of males in a given year. Besides, Landau (1995) used 
a sample of 1,268 managerial and professional employees’ self-reporting questionnaires, which 
showed the promotion potential of women was rated lower than of men. Finally, Konrad and 
Cannings (1997) use two companies to statistically examine the effects of gender discrimination 
and role congruence in managerial advancement. Their findings support the view that the 
managerial advancement process is different between women and men. 
In this paper, we study whether gender could be an element that affects the possibilities for 
women to be promoted as top executives in companies. Being promoted as a top executive not 
only means higher benefits and status but also recognition of past performance. Obviously, 
competition for promotion is very fierce, and actual promotions do give us the opportunity to 
study the real gender biases on the part of companies while appointing a chairperson of the 
board of directors (we call it chairperson hereafter) or a chief executive officer (we call it CEO 
hereafter). 
This paper uses the concept of Boschini and Sjögren (2007), which models team formation 
as a random matching process influenced by agents’ preferences for team size and gender, to 
examine the teamship of top executives of companies in Taiwan. Instead of collecting data from 
a small number of firms and conducting a case study, this paper uses information from 
thousands of large companies in Taiwan. The large size of the sample makes it possible to 
compare compositions of teams of top executives in different companies, controlling for 
industry, firm size, age of company and geographical locations of companies.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section the data is 
introduced. A random matching model is applied, and empirical results are reported in section 3. 
Section 4 offers conclusions.   
2. The Data 
Data used in this paper are from “Top5000: The Largest Corporations in Taiwan”, which is 
published by China Credit Information Service, Ltd., in June every year. The 2006 edition is 
used. China Credit Information Service, Ltd., sent out 16,780 questionnaires to companies 
which were covered in the 2005 edition and had sales of more than 60 million NT dollars (about 
2 million US dollars) in the case of manufacturing companies, or had assets of more than 30 
million NT dollars (about 1 million US dollars), in the case of services companies. Of the total, 
5,183 questionnaires were returned. Besides the information in returned questionnaires, the   2
source publication also links companies to their financial data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
Corporation. There are 4,857 companies included in the composite ranking. Several companies 
were found to have missing values, or had unrecognized information. So the total number of 
companies we use is 4,485. In the analysis data set, the main variables are the composite 
rankings of companies, names of chairpersons and CEOs, company age, zip code, and industry 
code. Gender of chairpersons and CEOs are identified by their Chinese first names.   
Chairpersons and CEOs of companies in the data are sorted by gender as shown in Table 1. 
Column 1 shows companies are sorted into even and single teams. A company with an even 
team is one which has different persons functioning as chairperson and CEO, while a company 
with a single team is one which has the same person holding both posts. Column 2 shows the 
number of female top executives corresponding to the team type, and Column 3 is the number of 
male top executives. Column (4) is the number of companies corresponding to the team types.   
Row (A) presents the gender composition of chairpersons and CEOs in even teams. There 
are 3,142 companies that have different persons as chairperson and CEO. Row (B) presents the 
gender composition of single teams in 1,343 companies covered in this data set. The sum of 
each column is shown in Row (C). It is found the total number of females observed is 460, and 
the total number of males is 7,167, in 4,485 companies covered by the data used for this paper.   
We find that female top executives are relatively scarce in Taiwan. In Table 1, the 
percentage in the parenthesis is the share calculated by rows: females’ share in chairpersons in 
even teams is 7.45%, while the share of females in single teams is only 3.43%. It is found that in 
both even and single teams, males dominate. The proportion of female and male workers is 
perhaps fairly equal at the entry level of labor markets. Then why at the top end does the ratio of 
females and males plunge to 1:16? Besides, there are fewer female CEOs than chairpersons. 
This makes one wonder whether there might be a gender preference among female chairpersons 
while hiring a CEO.   
3. Empirical Models and Results 
        The model used in this paper is based on that of Boschini and Sjögren (2007). We consider 
that every chairperson is randomly matched to a potential CEO. Based on the chairperson’s team 
preferences, he/she decides whether or not to hire a CEO for the company. We also assume that 
a fraction of the chairpersons might have gender preferences over the CEO’s.   
  Since the random matching model is similar to the one in Boschini and Sjögren (2007), two 
similar propositions can be obtained. First, if team preferences of both sexes are the same and 
gender preferences are also the same, gender would not be considered as an important element 
here. It means gender is irrelevant for term formation. Second, if gender neutrality and different 
preferences of team formation of the two sexes are assumed, it allows gender neutrality to be 
sustained even when team preferences of the two genders are different. For example, we might 
observe that female chairpersons have a higher propensity to cooperate with female CEOs than 
males. And, the gender neutrality hypothesis can still hold if men are more likely to work alone 
than women. 
  Based on these two propositions, we will first test whether there is difference of the 
partnership between chairman and chairwoman. And, if there is a difference, the single team 
type can then be tested in order to find support for the gender neutral hypothesis.   
The structure of the empirical model is also based on that of Boschini and Sjögren (2007). 
The probit model is applied. 
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Where  *
FC
ij Y  and  *
S
ij Y  are unobserved variables. Equation (1) denotes a chairperson’s 
tendency to cooperate with a female CEO while Equation (2) denotes a chairperson’s tendency 
to form a single team (to be the CEO as well). The observed outcome in Equation (1) is a 
binary variable: if  0 * Y
FC
ij    (i.e. the chairperson of i company in j industry cooperates with a 
female CEO), then 
FC
ij Y =1, otherwise 
FC
ij Y =0. The observed outcome variable in Equation (2) 
is also a binary variable: if  0 * Y
S
ij   (i.e. the chairperson and the CEO of i company in j 
industry is the same person), then 
S
ij Y =1, otherwise 
S
ij Y =0.  
Both equations share the same explanatory variables. The 1
st explanatory variable is the 
sex of the chairperson, i f . If the chairperson of company i is female, then  i f =1, otherwise 
i f =0. The 2
nd explanatory variable is the share of female CEOs in j industry,  ij  . There are 
three different industry classifications used in this paper: SCP, MCP and ACP. The first 
industry classification is SCP (Simple index of female CEO proportion). All companies are 
divided into 5 different industries, which are manufacturing, service, banking and finance, 
public enterprise and private universities. We then compute the female CEO proportion in each 
of the five industries. 
The second industry classification is MCP (Main index of CEO proportion). The main 
difference between MCP and SCP is that the industries are divided into 41 sub groups, and the 
representative industry code is chosen by the main product of a company. Representative 
industry codes are used to calculate the proportion of female CEOs.   
The third industry classification is ACP (Average index of CEO proportion), and it also 
uses the same 41 industry codes as MCP. But, since each company may not be listed for only 
one industry code, the number of corresponding female CEOs is calculated on a weighted basis. 
For example, if a company reports 3 different industry codes, it will be counted in all the three 
industries.  
The 3
rd explanatory variable is the interaction term of the sex of the chairperson and the 
share of female CEOs in the company’s industry,  ij i f  . The 4
th explanatory variable is a dummy 
variable of regions, i.e. the location of a company,  i POST . If i company is located in north 
Taiwan, then POSTi=1, if a company is located in non-north Taiwan, then POSTi=0. The 5
th 
explanatory variable is a dummy variable of established years of a company,  i EST . They are 
divided by intervals of 10 years into four groups. The benchmark of the established years is a 
company which was established less than 10 years ago. The 6
th explanatory variable is the size 
of a company,  i SIZE . The firm size is based on the net sales of the company, which means the 
higher is a company’s sales revenue, the bigger the company is. Firm sizes are divided into five 
levels.  
Based on the predictions the random matching model, we first want to test the gender 
neutrality, i.e. to check whether female and male chairpersons have different attitudes towards 
teaming up with female CEOs. The key coefficient in this step is 
FC
3    of Equation (1). Second, 
the single team tendency is examined, which can provide further support for the gender 
neutrality hypothesis. 
S
1   and 
S




3    is the coefficient of the interaction term of the chairperson’s sex ( i f ) and the share of   4
female CEOs ( ij  ). If 
C F
3  is statistically significantly different from zero, then it can be 
inferred that female and male chairpersons do have different attitudes towards the gender of 
CEOs, when forming a team. In other words, if the coefficient is insignificant, then it suggests 
that gender irrelevance might be true. 
 
S
1   is the coefficient of the chairperson’s sex ( i f ) in Equation (2). If it is statistically 
significantly different from zero, then it can be concluded that the gender of chairpersons does 
influence the decision to have a single team. 
S
3   is the coefficient of interaction term of 
chairperson’s sex and the proportion of female CEOs in Equation (2), which is used to test 
whether there is a difference between genders in deciding to form a single team, when the share 
of female CEOs is taken into account. If these two coefficients are not consistent to the previous 
model’s expectations, then the gender neutral hypothesis will not be sustained.   
  Estimation results of equations (1) and (2) are in tables 2 and 3. Three sets of independent 
variables are used: 
(i)  Chairperson’s sex ( i f ) for firm i and share of female CEOs ( ij  ) in industry j are 
included as explanatory variables. 
(ii) In addition to the variables in (1), an interaction term of chairperson’s sex and share of 
female CEOs ( ij i f  ) is added. 
(iii)In addition to (1) and (2), region ( i POST ), established years ( i EST ) and firm size 
( i SIZE ) are included. 
Table 2 shows the estimates of Equation (1), which are used to test the tendency of 
chairpersons of different sexes to opt for a female CEO. The total number of companies used in 
the estimation is 3,142, since single team companies are excluded. The table has three parts: 
columns (1), (2) and (3) use the same index of female CEO share, which is SCP, and columns 
(4), (5) and (6) are estimations using the MCP index as the share of female CEOs, while 
columns (7), (8) and (9) use the ACP index instead.   
Coefficients of the first explanatory variable, female chairperson (PSEX), is positive and 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 90% level in columns (5), (6), (8) and (9), 
which means female chairpersons tend to work with female CEOs under classifications of both 
MCP and ACP. The second explanatory variable, the female CEO share, is positive and 
statistically significantly different from zero in all estimations. It can be inferred that as the 
female CEO share increases, the number of chairpersons willing to team with female CEOs also 
increases.  
  The third explanatory variable is the interaction term of female chairperson and the female 
CEO share. Coefficients under the indices of MCP and ACP are negative and statistically 
significantly different from zero at 90% and 95% levels, respectively. This implies that when the 
female CEO share increases, a female chairperson has a lower tendency to cooperate with 
female CEOs, than male chairpersons. 
Next, the results of estimations of Equation (2) are shown in Table 3. The layout of Table 3 
is the same as that of Table 2, since explanatory variables of single team estimations are the 
same as those of female teams estimations. All observed companies are used for single team 
estimation in Table 3; there are 4,485 companies. 
  From the first row of Table 3, coefficients of female chairpersons are negative and 
statistically significantly different from zero at 95% level in seven out of nine columns, which 
means female chairpersons have lower possibilities of working alone than male chairpersons. 
Coefficients of the explanatory variable, female CEO share, are negative and statistically 
significant in columns (3), (6) and (9), which means that as the share of female CEOs increases, 
the number of companies that opt for a single team decreases. However, the interaction term of 
the female chairperson and the female CEO share is insignificant in all estimations. Thus, there   5
is no conclusive information about how the female CEOs share can influence the different 
genders of chairpersons who opt for a single team.   
Combining the estimation results and the two propositions derived in the model section, the 
gender irrelevant hypothesis is first examined. It is found that coefficients of the interaction term 
FC




m  . Thus, the gender irrelevant hypothesis is failed. Second, 
coefficients of single team are examined with coefficients of female chairpersons 
S
1  < 0, which 
shows that female chairpersons have a lower tendency to form a single team than male 
chairpersons. However, coefficient of the interaction term of female chairpersons and female 
CEOs share, 
S
3  , is insignificant. Since the gender neutral hypothesis is sustained only when 
S
1  >0 and 
S
3  <0 are satisfied, the gender neutral hypothesis is also failed. 
4. Conclusions 
  Wage differentials and occupational segregation are often considered as the main issues of 
gender discrimination in labor markets. Since women now receive higher education and have 
more labor market choices. The seriousness of the wage gap and occupation segregation is 
decreasing. However, the promotion process and standards are still not the same and fair for 
female  and  male  workers.     
In this paper, data from the 2006 edition of “Top5000: The Largest Corporations in 
Taiwan”, published by China Credit Information Service, Ltd. is used to investigate whether 
there are gender preferences when a chairperson names a CEO. The total number of companies 
is 4,485. The team formation process is assumed as random matching, which is similar to 
Boschini and Sjögren (2007). 
  First, based on the descriptive statistics in the data section, there are only a few female 
chairpersons and CEOs in these top companies, i.e. about 6%. We also found that chairpersons 
have a higher tendency to work with same sex CEOs. This means there is gender gap in 
teamship choices between male and female chairpersons. Second, based on the results of the 
estimations, both the gender irrelevant hypothesis and gender neutral hypothesis in the random 
matching model are not sustained by the estimated coefficients of equations (1) and (2).   
Notice that the empirical test suggests that a female chairperson has a lower tendency to 
cooperate with a female CEO than a male chairperson, when the female CEO share increases in 
some industry segments. Promoting a candidate as CEO may be a complex decision, especially 
in a big company. A chairperson needs to consider many aspects, such as opinions of company’s 
senior managers and the relationship between the competitors and future CEOs. Therefore, 
female chairpersons may face more pressure to name a same sex CEO in male dominated 
working environments. On the other hand, male chairpersons may team with a female CEO in 
order to bring in different perspectives, especially in female dominated industries.     6
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Table 1: Gender of Chairperson and CEO 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 




Chairperson     234  (7.45%)  2,908 (92.55%) 
3,142 (100%) 
CEO  180 (5.73%)  2,962 (94.27%) 
(B) 
Single Team  46 (3.43%)  1,297 (96.57%)  1,343 (100%) 
(C) 
Total Observations  460  7,167  4,485   8
Table 2: Probit Estimation of Team Composition with Female CEOs (Marginal Effects) 
   SCP        MCP        ACP   
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9) 
Female Chairman (PSEX)  0.0214  -0.00797 -0.00486   0.0161  0.0852*  0.0836*    0.0167  0.100*  0.0991* 
 (0.0175)  (0.0617) (0.0637)    (0.0166) (0.0493) (0.0497)    (0.0167) (0.0541) (0.0548) 
Female CEO Share (FCS)  1.108**  1.065** 0.972**  (MCP)  0.891** 0.954**  0.932**  (ACP)  0.919** 0.991** 0.970** 
 (0.325)  (0.340)  (0.346)    (0.111)  (0.116) (0.115)    (0.118) (0.123) (0.122) 
PSEX*FCS   0.496  0.394  PSEX*MCP   -0.682*  -0.695** PSEX*ACP   -0.807** -0.825** 
   (1.204)  (1.190)      (0.351) (0.349)      (0.371) (0.370) 
North  Taiwan     0.00136       0.00693       0.00758 
     (0.00926)      (0.00841)      (0.00840) 
Established Years 
11~20 
   0.00881       0.00388       0.00388 
   (0.0113)       (0.0105)       (0.0105) 
Established Years 
21~30 
   0.00617       0.00131       0.00171 
   (0.0128)       (0.0116)       (0.0117) 
Established Years 
>30 
    -0.00849      -0.0154       -0.0155 
   (0.0113)       (0.0101)       (0.0101) 
Firm Size Level 
(2
nd highest level) 
    0.0247*       0.0202       0.0203 
   (0.0145)       (0.0135)       (0.0136) 
Firm Size Level 
(3
rd highest level) 
   0.0167       0.0108       0.0109 
   (0.0143)       (0.0131)       (0.0131) 
Firm Size Level 
(4
th highest level) 
    0.0139       0.00911       0.00932 
   (0.0142)       (0.0130)       (0.0131) 
Firm Size Level 
(5
th highest level) 
    0.0329*       0.0273       0.0278 
   (0.0191)       (0.0178)       (0.0179) 
N=3,142. The robust standard errors are listed in the parentheses, and constant is not reported. *significant at the 90% level; **significant at the 95% level. SCP: 5 industry classifications.   
MCP: 41 industry classifications. ACP: 41 industry classifications and each company may have more than one industry code.   9
Table 3: Probit Estimation of Single Team Composition (Marginal Effects) 
    SCP     MCP     ACP   
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Female Chairman (PSEX)  -0.143** -0.0869 -0.100  -0.142** -0.161** -0.170** -0.142** -0.154** -0.163** 
  (0.0234)  (0.122) (0.118)  (0.0235) (0.0438) (0.0432) (0.0235) (0.0464) (0.0459) 
Female CEO Share (FCS)  -0.557  -0.494  -1.244**  -0.320  -0.347  -0.486**  -0.361  -0.378  -0.497* 
  (0.554)  (0.567)  (0.590) (0.236) (0.245) (0.247) (0.249) (0.257) (0.260) 
PSEX*FCS   -1.335  -1.337    0.462 0.433    0.296 0.239 
  (2.628)  (2.633)  (0.934)  (0.963)  (0.983)  (1.013) 
North Taiwan 
 
    0.0424**    0.0356**    0.0354** 
    (0.0154)    (0.0153)    (0.0153) 
Established Years 
11~20 
    0.0643**    0.0679**    0.0679** 
    (0.0194)    (0.0194)    (0.0194) 
Established Years 
21~30 
    0.0726**    0.0786**    0.0786** 
    (0.0218)    (0.0218)    (0.0218) 
Established Years 
>30 
    -0.00449     0.00442     0.00467 
    (0.0206)    (0.0206)    (0.0206) 
Firm Size Level 
(2
nd highest level) 
    0.0686**    0.0703**    0.0703** 
    (0.0225)    (0.0225)    (0.0225) 
Firm Size Level 
(3
rd highest level) 
    0.124**    0.125**    0.125** 
    (0.0228)    (0.0229)    (0.0229) 
Firm Size Level 
(4
th highest level) 
    0.161**    0.160**    0.160** 
    (0.0230)    (0.0230)    (0.0230) 
Firm Size Level 
(5
th highest level) 
    0.138**    0.136**    0.136** 
    (0.0278)    (0.0277)    (0.0277) 
N=4,485. The robust standard errors are listed in the parentheses, and constant is not reported. *significant at the 90% level; **significant at the 95% level. SCP: 5 industry classifications.   
MCP: 41 industry classifications. ACP: 41 industry classifications and each company may have more than one industry code.   